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Daniel Whistler 
 
 
‘Hail in the name of those who seek the name for your endurance.’ 
—Mokhtar in Badiou’s The Incident at Antioch I.iii (2013 21) 
‘A truth begins to dawn on the horizon.’ 
—The Stranger in Strindberg’s The Road to Damascus I (1983 204) 
 
 
 
Part One: A Mystic-without-Mysticism 
 
Act One of the The Incident at Antioch takes place on the road to Damascus, and its action 
revolves around one moment of ecstatic illumination: the protagonist, Paula, ‘fall[s] to the 
ground, arms outstretched’ (2013 27), unconsciously imitating Caravaggio’s The Road to 
Damascus in which St Paul falls from a horse, arms outstretched, in an ecstatic fit of divine 
revelation.
1
 Paula is, in this moment of ‘feverish exaltation’ (29), ‘a young woman 
experiencing the joys of the new’ (31), thinking and speaking from a ‘place out of place’ 
(2013 29) (a Badiouian utopia). Moreover, Paula’s words here become simultaneously 
cryptic and full of meaning: ‘The pebbles in my mouth are giving way to clear words.’ (27) 
The ‘transparency’ (29) to which she ecstatically refers is linguistic as well as cognitive, and, 
as such, the words themselves—as spoken on the stage—bring forth an excess of meaning, an 
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excess faithful to Paula’s experience of a new truth, but cryptic to her audience. She speaks 
in, what Badiou will call in Saint Paul, ‘unutterable utterances’.2 
 On the basis of the above, it seems safe to venture that Paula’s actions and words 
repeat many of the traditional patterns of religious mysticism: momentary ecstasy, a fit-like 
state, cryptic transparency and blinding obscurity. Paula would fit snugly into the pages of 
The Varieties of Religious Experience. A convenient point of comparison—one I expand 
upon throughout what follows—is August Strindberg’s The Road to Damascus trilogy, which 
provides a more traditionally mystical re-enactment of this moment of Pauline ecstasy. The 
protagonist of these plays, The Stranger, is similarly prone to mystic fits in which his 
language becomes both clear and obscure as he feels himself reborn; for instance,  
 
The clouds have now lifted, the sky opened, the wind is warm, feel as it caresses us. 
This is what I call living; yes, now I live, now more than ever, and I feel myself grow, 
extend outwards, dilute, vanish into infinity; I am everywhere, in the sea which is my 
blood, in the rocks which are my bones, in the trees, in the flowers; my head knocks 
against the sky and I contemplate the universe in which I am mixed up, and I feel in 
me the force of the Creator, for I am that Creator. (1983 177)
3
 
 
Again, this speech consists in ‘pure and beautiful enigmas’ (303) or ‘unutterable utterances’; 
there is little, I venture, at the level of rhetoric and pragmatics that could distinguish The 
Stranger’s speech from Paula’s. 
Paula’s mysticism is acknowledged within The Incident at Antioch, but crucially at 
the very same time it is also denied. Thus, as Paula undergoes her ‘ecstatic revelation’ 
(Reinhard 2013 xliii), Mokhtar comments on her as 
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Like one fallen spread-eagled under the light, but it’s not God speaking to her. For 
it’s giving up those trappings that’s knocking her down and making her spring back 
up to achieve the precision of an axiom. (Badiou 2013 31) 
 
Paula is a mystic-without-mysticism: one that performs ‘an immanent break’ (2001 42), 
rather than submission to a truth from above. As Badiou insists throughout his work, ‘Truth is 
a process, and not an illumination’ (2003 15) While Paula is mystic-like, a radical difference 
separates her from religious mystics. And it is this play of similarities and radical difference 
that I wish to explore further in this paper, with particular emphasis on strategies of naming. 
 There is, of course, a simple way to distinguish Paula from The Stranger using the 
resources of Badiou’s own philosophy—by means of the category of the obscure subject 
outlined in Logics of Worlds. I will return to this at length in Part Three; however, one 
example will illustrate my point. Badiou’s description of the obscure subjects of love vividly 
recalls the tormented relationship of The Stranger and The Lady in Strindberg’s The Road to 
Damascus. They fully fit Badiou’s classification: they renounce the event in the name of a 
transcendent, atemporal fetish and a life governed by destiny, and do so by means of ‘a 
deadly possessive reciprocity’ that ‘turns the enchanted present into night’ (Badiou 2009 74). 
As one character remarks in Strindberg’s play, ‘they torment each other in order to finally 
arrive at reconciliation with God’ (1983 186). However, this may distinguish the subject-
positions of Strindberg’s mystics from Badiou’s militants, but not the names they use or the 
language they speak. What I am interested in, on the contrary, is the criteria immanent to 
language itself for differentiating Paula from The Stranger, i.e. how to distinguish the 
linguistic practices of mysticism from those of the mystic-without-mysticism. In other words, 
the theory of the obscure subject is insufficient for my purposes; more investigation is 
required. 
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To put the above another way: Badiou’s own philosophy approaches mysticism in his 
theory of the supernumerary name. Hence, Paula’s language of excessive transparency, which 
‘pull[s] names away from the usage that prostitutes them’ (Badiou 2001 40), illustrates 
particularly clearly the extent of the closeness between Badiou’s practices of naming and 
those of traditional mystics, precisely because it enacts Badiou’s own ‘mysterious’ doctrine. 
That is, The Incident at Antioch’s emphasis on the illegal and anonymous nature of the name 
that announces the event to the audience is to be identified with that very doctrine of the 
supernumerary name in Badiou’s philosophy that is subsequently jettisoned in Logic of 
Worlds precisely because it is too ‘mysterious’. Badiou, by his own admission, is too much of 
a mystic when he invokes a name that comes from nowhere, that means both nothing and too 
much and that gives birth to an ecstatic subject. This is why Badiou’s philosophy of the name 
in Being and Event will act as my starting-point; it is here that one finds, implicitly 
dramatized, the mysticism that is constantly being abjected from Badiou’s system. 
 The guiding thread throughout this paper, as we have seen, is the road to Damascus 
itself in Badiou’s depiction of Paul and Paula and August Strindberg’s trilogy. Whether Saul 
actually became Paul or not at the moment of ecstatic conversion, this moment of 
illumination has still traditionally been taken as a site of baptism: of new names and new 
languages. The road to Damascus is an evental site of nomination in all its configurations 
(mystic, theological, theatrical and philosophical)—and it is for this reason that I deploy it in 
what follows to trace the similarities and differences in how Badiou and Strindberg conceive 
of ‘the power of names’ (Badiou 2005 372). To this end, Part Two provides a typology of 
different naming practices in Badiou, the philosophy of theatre and Strindberg’s mysticism, 
respectively, before, in Part Three, I pursue in more detail a direct contrast between 
Badiouian and Strindbergian nomination, thereby building up a more detailed picture of the 
ways in which Badiou and the mystic theorise and practise nomination. 
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Part Two: The Power of Names 
 
1.1 Badiouian Names 
In Logics of Worlds, Badiou confesses to the problematic mysticism inherent in his earlier 
theory of naming: 
 
Perspicacious readers (namely Desanti, Deleuze, Nancy and Lyotard) quickly brought 
to my notice that I was framing the ontological definition of ‘what happens’ both 
from below and from above. From below, by positing the existence, required by 
every event, of an event-site, whose formal structure I rather laboriously delineated. 
From above, by demanding that every event receive a name. One could then say, on 
the one hand, that there was in fact a ‘worldly’ structure of the event (its site, 
summoning the void of every situation), and on the other, a rather unclear 
transcendental structure (the name, attributed by an anonymous subject). As we shall 
see, I am now able fundamentally to equate ‘site’ and ‘evental multiplicity’—thus 
avoiding all the banal aporias of the dialectic between structure and historicity—and 
that I do so without any recourse to a mysterious naming. (2009 361) 
 
While the definition of ‘what happens’ from below is retained in Logics of Worlds—albeit 
seriously modified—the ‘mysterious… transcendental structure’ in which a supernumerary 
name is ‘attributed by an anonymous subject’ is completely jettisoned. Badiou is even clearer 
in his Preface to the English translation of Ethics: 
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Today I can no longer maintain that the only trace left by an event in the situation it 
affects is the name given to that event. This idea presumed, in effect, that there were 
two events rather than one (the event-event and the event-naming), and likewise two 
subjects rather than one (the subject who names the event, and the subject who is 
faithful to this naming). (2001 lvi) 
 
In short, after Being and Event, the theory of the supernumerary name is disposed of, and 
with it the doubled-event and doubled-subject. For such a theory is too ‘mysterious’. It is here 
then that Badiou flirts most with the mystic: mystery exists in Badiou’s system to be abjected. 
And so, since what he abjects brings him closest to mysticism, it is here in the discarded trash 
from Being and Event that we will find a way-in to the delineation of the figure of the mystic-
without-mysticism outlined in the Introduction. 
 To briefly sketch supernumerary nomination: Being and Event orients itself around 
the ‘fundamental’ thesis: ‘there is some newness in being’, and such newness (a truth) is 
recognised by means of an intervention, ‘naming that ‘there is’’ (2005 203): ‘The initial 
operation of an intervention is to make a name out of an unpresented element of the site to 
qualify the event.’ (204) In fact, Badiou goes further still: as Ethics makes clear, this act of 
recognition-through-naming is not posterior, accidental nor even inessential to the event, 
rather it is to be identified with the being of the event itself: ‘The fundamental ontological 
characteristic of an event is to inscribe, to name, the situated void of that for which it is an 
event.’ (2001 69; my emphasis) Such nomination gives rise to a militant subject, one with 
‘another mode of discernment… which, outside knowledge but within the effect of an 
interventional nomination, explores the connections to the supernumerary name of the event.’ 
(2005 329) The subject consists in an incessant fidelity to the originary naming by which the 
event is recognised; hence, both the event and the subject exist within (and themselves exude) 
a ‘nominal aura’ (398). 
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 The name itself has two properties: it is illegal and anonymous (2005 513). It is illegal 
because, in the set of existing knowledge that constitutes the state of the world prior to the 
advent of the new (i.e. that knowledge which ‘measures being to language such as it is’, 
according to the names that already exist), there is no rule or index that might indicate the 
meaning of the supernumerary name. There is ‘nothing in the situation, no rule whatsoever, 
[that] authorises [the name’s] distinction from any other.’ (206) Intervening nomination is 
thus illegal. Moreover, the name is anonymous since ‘the name drawn from the void is 
indistinguishable precisely because it is drawn from the void’ (513). Or, as Badiou puts it 
more fully,  
 
Knowledge does not know of the event because the name of the event is 
supernumerary, and so it does not belong to the language of the situation. When I say 
that it does not belong to the latter, this is not necessarily in a material sense whereby 
the name would be barbarous, incomprehensible or non-listed. What qualifies the 
name or event is that it is drawn from the void… Even if the name of the event is very 
simple, and it is definitely listed in the language of the situation, it is supernumerary 
as name of the event… and it is foreclosed from knowledge. (329) 
 
The name is new—not in the material sense of being a new combination of letters or 
syllables—but as a signifying occurrence. And this novelty of meaning (that bears witness to 
but also partially constitutes a truth) comes out of nowhere: it is a new name which no one 
can understand, interpret or decipher on the basis of what has come before. From this 
perspective, intervention constitutes ‘a language of the unnameable’ (2001 376). In other 
words, ‘the very secret of intervention’ resides in the fact that ‘legitimate nomination is 
impossible’ (2005 289). This name subtracts from all others through an operation of hyper-
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asceticism
4
; it bores an ‘unreasonable hole within the tissue of language’ (294). It is 
excessive: ‘a name in excess’ (2001 394). 
 The event is therefore partially constituted (and simultaneously recognised) through 
this name both excessive and empty, both indiscernible and making all the difference. Thus, 
early Badiouianism glorifies a language in which ‘solely the production of a supernumerary 
name initiates the thought of the indiscernible’ (2005 319; my emphasis) or ‘the only trace 
left by an event in the situation it affects is the name given to that event’ (2009 361; my 
emphasis). In the end, what matters most is the name: truth and novelty are accessed, thought 
and experienced solely by means of a name that means both nothing and too much. 
 
1.2 Dramatic Names 
‘Every name from which a truth proceeds is a name from before the Tower of Babel. But it 
has to circulate in the tower.’ (Badiou 2003 110) It is in this way that Badiou glosses 
Philippians II.1 at the end of Saint Paul, and here, in this admittedly late text, we can still 
hear the reverberations of the doctrine of the supernumerary name. The name bores a hole in 
the confusions and dispersions of already-existing nominations to give rise to a linguistic 
state that is simultaneously fuller and emptier, one that repeats the fullness and emptiness of 
all origins. The evental name is untimely (an issue to which I return at length at the end of the 
paper), a primal word in the midst of contemporary jargon. 
 And here once more, of course, Badiou touches on mystic motifs, particularly the 
Adamicism that dominates much modern mystic thinking about language, whether the 
Logosmystik of Böhme or the pasigraphy of Wilkins. Even more significant for my present 
purposes, moreover, is that this appeal to primal, uncorrupted names informs a tradition of 
philosophising about theatre too. One of the Urdokumente of modern philosophy of theatre, 
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Lessing’s 1769 Letter to Nicolai, reflects on dramatic language in this precise context. For 
Lessing, the theatre perfects language by transforming its arbitrary and mutable signs into 
originary and true names. A brief discussion of Lessing’s claim will therefore bring out more 
clearly the binding together of the three terms at stake in this paper: mystic names, 
Badiouianism and the theatre. Of course, it needs to be continually emphasised that in no way 
can or should Badiou’s theory of names be reduced to this mystic Adamicism; yet, hopefully 
sufficient evidence has been adduced as to the their closeness as to make this juxtaposition of 
the Badiouian description of the name of a truth with the theatrical search for a true name 
appear fruitful. 
 In the late eighteenth-century context in which Lessing writes, such Adamic 
language—the language of true names—was identified with ‘natural signs’, pre-Babelian 
remnants that truly name their referent by means of a substantial ontological connection. In 
Mendelssohn’s definition, signs ‘are natural if the combination of the sign with the subject 
matter is grounded in the very properties of what is designated.’ (1997 178) Traces of this 
utopic grounding relation remain scattered among post-Babelian languages in onomatopoeia, 
metaphor and algebraic symbolism, and, just as in Paula’s ecstatic speeches in The Incident at 
Antioch, are to be recognised by a kind of transparency that exceeds our control—
‘perspicuity without exertion’, in Mendelssohn’s terms (1997 255, 273). 
 According to Lessing, therefore, the task of the playwright is to ‘endeavour absolutely 
to elevate arbitrary signs into natural ones’ (1985 134). That is, the playwright must aim to 
recover pre-Babelian names and circulate them in the tower. Lessing envisages such a task as 
follows, 
 
Poetry must endeavour to absolutely elevate its arbitrary signs into natural ones… 
The means it employs to do this are tone, choice of words, arrangement of words, 
metre, figures of speech, tropes, metaphors, and so forth. All these things cause the 
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arbitrary signs to approximate more closely to the natural, but they do not make them 
natural signs; consequently all the kinds of poetry that employ only these means are 
to be regarded as the lower kinds of poetry, and the highest kind of poetry is the one 
that turns the arbitrary signs wholly into natural signs. Now that is dramatic poetry, 
for in drama the words cease to be arbitrary signs, and become the natural signs of 
arbitrary things. (134) 
 
In drama, talk is brought to life and made present on the stage, so that, in David Wellbery’s 
words, ‘the speech itself is an action… sign and object are not only similar, but coincide’ 
(1984 225). Wellbery continues, 
 
Only in dramatic poetry does the poet’s language function as a natural sign and 
therefore only in the drama does poetry achieve its ideal. As performative speech, the 
poem is the very reality it designates, for this reality itself is the activity of 
speaking… Perfected mimesis is not the imitation of an object or action, it is the 
action itself. (227) 
 
The natural sign is only really possible in the fusion of sign and referent; in performance, the 
sign embodies what it refers to and thus meaning shines perfectly from it. Meaning is 
excessively present in the drama; it does not lie elsewhere. In other words, the performative 
nature of theatre results in true names, according to Lessing. The stage acts as a portal 
transporting signs back to their archaic state. Watching a play thereby becomes a kind of 
mystical experience, a belated repetition of Adam’s acts of naming described in Genesis 2. 
 
1.3 Mystic Names 
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Strindberg’s post-Inferno dramatic work stands in continuity with this tradition. He too 
conceives of the dramatic endeavour as a means of overcoming post-Babelian confusion. 
Thus, in The Road to Damascus II, The Stranger tells the story of Babel as presented in the 
Zohar in which maleficent demons constructed the tower to ‘confound language as well as 
reason’ for they feared man’s capacity for knowledge. He continues, 
 
Since that time the powers have reigned by means of discord [so that now] if some 
mortal is able to penetrate the secrets of the powers, no one will believe him and he 
will be marked with madness… Only the mad are reasonable, for they see, hear and 
sense what escapes their eyes, ears and heart, but they cannot communicate their 
experiences to others. (1983 244) 
 
The Stranger, though, wishes to confound the demons in return, overcome Babelian 
confusion and attain a purer language: 
 
I must create a double: adjoin to my own personality that of another being who can 
absorb in him everything that enchains my spirit. So that my soul can find once more 
the purer, hotter atmosphere which will impel it still higher towards the ether, so that, 
transcending the Dominations, it will go up to the throne of God and place at the feet 
of the Eternal the woes of humankind. (248) 
 
This is a programmatic statement for Strindberg’s late dramatic art: ascent through catharsis. 
By creating a sacrificial double for himself on the stage, Strindberg attempts to purify his 
thinking and his words. A discussion from The Road to Damascus I illuminates this process 
further:  
 
The Mother: Why do you call Ingeborg ‘Eve’? 
12 
 
The Stranger:  By giving her a name myself, I made her mine, and I intend to 
transform her completely according to my will. 
The Mother:  So that she resembles you! (She laughs.) I’ve heard of sorcerers from 
the village who sometimes create a mannequin representing someone 
on whom they wish to cast a spell and they baptise it with the name 
of the man they have decided to strike down. Likewise, in the person 
of this Eve who would be your work you have tried to damn her 
entire race. (188) 
 
I will return to the specifics of this baptism later in the section; for now, what is crucial is the 
link here established between nomination and the creation of an abject theatrical double, ‘a 
mannequin’. A central component of the mystic ascent is the ability to name correctly.5 Thus, 
once again, the problematic of the true name is at stake; indeed, Strindberg draws on a 
plethora of naming strategies in his plays to achieve his goals of purification and ascent. In 
what follows, I focus on two of them to give some indication of how Strindberg perpetuates 
the project of undoing the curse of Babel. 
 
* 
 
The determining influence on almost all late-modern language-mysticism is Swedenborg’s 
doctrine of correspondences—and Strindberg is no exception. It was on 29th March 1896, 
Palm Sunday, that Strindberg first discovered Swedenborg: 
 
I came to a stop in front of a row of Balzac’s novels bound in blue, picked up his 
Séraphita quite by chance… When I got home I opened the book, which was 
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practically unknown to me, as so many years had passed since I first read it. Now, 
with a mind prepared to receive it, I devoured the contents of this remarkable work as 
if it were something entirely new. In my homeland and his, Swedenborg was regarded 
as a charlatan, a madman with a distorted and lewd imagination. I had never read a 
word he had written, and I was now carried away by admiration for this angelic giant 
of the last century, interpreted as he was here by the most profound of French 
geniuses… So it was that Swedenborg came into my life, in which has played an 
immense part. He came on the actual anniversary of his death, bringing me the palms 
of victory or of martyrdom. (1979 144-5) 
 
Swedenborg was to become ‘a guardian angel’ (210), for in his writings were to be found, 
according to Strindberg, ‘the answer to the principal riddles of our spiritual life’ (215). 
 Swedenborg’s founding statement of the doctrine of correspondences occurs in 
Heaven and Hell: 
 
The whole natural world corresponds to the spiritual world, and not merely the 
natural world in general, but also every particular of it; and as a consequence 
everything in the natural world that springs from the spiritual world is called a 
correspondent. It must be understood that the natural world springs from and has 
permanent existence from the spiritual world, precisely like an effect from its 
effecting cause… From this is the correspondence. (2000 §89, §96) 
 
In such passages, Swedenborg rehashes the traditional analogia ordonis in which, because 
the effect resembles its cause but at a far lower degree of reality, the name of the effect 
provides a means of understanding the nature of the cause, even if a radically inadequate one. 
Swedenborg speaks very much in this tradition, when he distinguishes between ‘a literal 
sense… and a spiritual sense in the Word’ (§114). And yet Swedenborg—almost despite 
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himself—goes beyond this: for, to angels, mystics and humans before Babel, the name of the 
effect is equally the name of the cause: neither is merely inadequately predicated. Thus, ‘at 
the present day no one can know the spiritual things in heaven to which the natural things in 
the world correspond except from heaven’ (§110), but, yet, ‘the most ancient people, who 
were celestial men, thought from correspondence itself, as the angels do’ (§87).6 That is, for 
these angels and ‘ancient peoples’ (as well as for other ‘celestial men’ like Swedenborg 
himself), the earthly and heavenly senses of a name are co-primary: both lay claim to literal 
truth. There are multiple literal meanings bound to each sign. And the role of the mystic is to 
become once more an angelic, pre-Babelian subject by affirming the excessive truths that 
each name carries. The mystic subject must bear witness to dual, literal meanings in singular 
names. 
 Strindberg reconceives the doctrine of correspondences in a more tortured form.
7
 The 
subject must bear the agonising sense-contradictions enfolded into a name. The multiple 
truths signified by the subject’s own name, for instance, ruptures one’s harmonious unity in 
the name of a duplicitous existence. The very end of The Road to Damascus trilogy, in which 
The Stranger, having ascended to the mystic retreat of the White House, is shown around the 
Hall of Paintings, illuminates this property of the mystic name particularly clearly. 
 Just as, in the programmatic statement rehearsed above, the creator purges himself of 
contradiction in a dramatic double who performs him, so too here the monks of the White 
House are able to achieve self-identity at the expense of those they artistically depict—the 
two-headed great men of history. While the monks ‘have only one head’ (1983 356), all their 
painted subjects ‘have at least two’ (354). In this way, Father Clement has painted Luther 
double-headed as ‘the young champion of tolerance, the old champion of intolerance’ (354)8 
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and similarly Voltaire, ‘the atheist who spent his life defending God’ (356). Of the painting 
of F.L. Stolberg, it is said, ‘Wrote a fanatical book in defence of Protestantism and poof! Is 
converted to Catholicism… A miracle, maybe? A little Road to Damascus without a doubt?’ 
(357) And here we glimpse some of the significance of Strindberg’s conception of the road to 
Damascus for a theory of nomination: the Damascus-illumination is the moment where the 
inconsistent senses of the name are at their most severe, the moment of acute contradiction 
which causes the most suffering to the name-bearer ‘falling to the ground, arms outstretched’. 
Ecstatic illumination and the unbearable duplicity of names here coincide, making possible 
the subsequent ascent towards which Strindberg’s drama is directed. 
 Moreover, according to Strindberg, there has been one exemplary subject who most 
fully embraced nominal duplicity and revelled in the proliferation of senses felt at these 
Damascus-moments: Napoleon.
9
 He writes, 
 
Napoleon! Created by the Revolution! Emperor of the people, Nero of 
liberty, tyrant of equality, ‘venerable brother’ of fraternity. He is the most 
astute of all these two-headed people, for he could laugh at himself, raise 
himself above his inconsistencies, take on a new skin, change his soul and 
with each metamorphosis feel truly like a new incarnation with perfect 
conviction. (1983 356)
10
 
 
Napoleon self-consciously creates new meanings for his life, revels in their multiplicity under 
a single name; he joyfully suffers the acute contradictions of his name, transforming them 
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each representing “a stage on life’s way”.’ (356-7) However, notice how Kierkegaard’s strategy towards 
nomination is slightly different: instead of bearing multiplicity in one name, he multiplies names in his 
pseudonyms. He thus synthesises the two naming strategies discussed in this section. 
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into moments of liberation. Napoleon is that Christic double or mannequin who happily takes 
on himself all the pain of nominal inconsistency to make possible Strindberg’s own mystic 
ascent. 
 
* 
 
We have already read of the role Balzac’s Séraphita played in bringing Strindberg to 
Swedenborg on Palm Sunday 1896. However, the significance of Séraphita in its own right 
for Strindberg’s naming practices should not be overlooked. From that day in 1896, 
‘Séraphita became my gospel’ (1979 145), and its own fictional performance of 
Swedenborg’s doctrines became paradigmatic for Strindberg’s own attempts in his late 
drama.
11
 
 Balzac’s novel aims at re-presenting the essence of Swedenborgian doctrine, yet it 
ends up an unorthodox repetition. For, while he acknowledges the importance of the doctrine 
of correspondences ‘by which the world is placed in unison with heaven’ (1889 51), Balzac is 
rarely concerned in Séraphita with the multiple literal senses of each name, but rather the 
reverse: multiple names for one referent. Names proliferate around (in this case) a person, 
cumulatively aggregating meaning by means of this process of accumulation.
12
 
 As one character muses, the word may forever try to constrain nature, but nature 
always exceeds the word (1889 33); however, at the same time, words ‘carry [nature] up to a 
third, a ninth or a twenty-seventh power… obtain[ing] magical results by constraining the 
processes of nature’. Language strives ever onwards to capture the world—and thus will 
always proliferate names—but in so doing, it potentiates and intensifies the world by means 
of ‘a mysterious optic which increases, or diminishes, or exalts creation’. Names ‘act upon 
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[us] at times like the torpedo which electrifies or paralyses the fisherman, at other times like a 
dose of phosphorous which stimulates life and accelerates its propulsion.’ (34) The names of 
Seraphita/Seraphitus is where this idea of potentiation through proliferation is most evident: 
Seraphita/Seraphitus bears this dual name as a reflection of his/her Adamic androgyny. 
Again, the project of undoing the curse of Babel lurks in the background: 
Seraphita/Seraphitus cannot be given one proper name in a post-Babelian era of linguistic 
dispersion and confusion. It is for this reason that at his/her birth, his/her father (acting as an 
avatar of Swedenborg) proclaims, ‘Our child is to be without name on this earth. You must 
not baptise in the waters of an earthly Church one who has just been immersed in the fires of 
Heaven.’ (58) Hence, only a series of names can approximate. Not until the end of the novel 
do the characters even begin to acknowledge the plurality of Seraphita’s/Seraphitus’ names 
(104) and start their own ascent upwards but also backwards towards an Edenic state. At this 
point, 
 
Wilfred and Minna were enabled to understand some of the mysterious sayings of 
Him who had appeared on earth in the form of which to each of them had rendered 
him comprehensible—to one Seraphitus, to the other Seraphita—for they saw that all 
was homogenous in the sphere where he now was. (127) 
 
That is, the other characters here begin an apprenticeship in an archaic language of true 
names, ‘a language as superior to thought as thought is to instinct’ (86)—that is, the language 
of correspondences. Such a language annuls the multiplicity of names that circulate after 
Babel, and—in orthodox Swedenborgian fashion—rediscover the correspondent names that 
signify multiple truths. 
 The Road to Damascus is also a drama of multiple nominations. The Stranger is a 
protagonist in search of a name, and throughout the trilogy tries on various appellations 
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(Caesar, Adam, Cain, Christ).
13
 Through this proliferating series which parallels trials of 
purification and redemption, he gradually ascends to the White House to enter a death-like 
state of beatific stasis, and it is here he receives his final, true name: 
 
Finally you will be resurrected among the dead, you will abandon your former name 
and we will baptise you like a small child. What name shall we give you?... I see that 
John has been written. Brother John. (1983 359) 
 
Having finally been baptised, the Stranger can now ‘rest in peace’, as the final words of the 
trilogy put it (360). The Road to Damascus, then, is a road leading from nominal proliferation 
and dispersion to the Edenic state of a single, meaningful name. 
 It is not just The Stranger, however, who undergoes name-changes, so too The Lady. 
Nameless at the opening of The Road to Damascus I, The Stranger becomes Adam in 
bestowing upon her one true name: 
 
It’s strange: I love to see you in my thoughts without personality, without name. I 
only half know what you are called; in fact, I’d love to give you a name myself. Let’s 
see, what can I call you? Yes, I’ll call you Eve. (1983 154) 
 
We learn later that Eve is also named Ingeborg, and indeed at the end of the trilogy, once the 
salvific White House is almost reached, ‘on the other side of the river, with life below us, 
behind us’ (307), The Stranger calls her Ingeborg for the first time, adding, ‘I have never met 
Ingeborg until now, never known her until now’ (333).14 
 Nevertheless, it is The Lady’s initial baptism as Eve that will prove most significant 
for the rest of my paper, precisely because of its Badiouian resonances (even if it is a firmly 
                                                          
13
 See, respectively, Strindberg 1983 195, 188, 267, 215. 
14
 In fact, he first calls her Ingeborg a few pages earlier in similar circumstances (307). 
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non-Badiouian act of nomination). The Lady receives the name ‘Eve’ from an anonymous, 
nameless source in an encounter with a loved one. The trilogy as a whole follows The Lady 
and The Stranger’s struggles to stay faithful to this defining event; it drives the plot and fills 
out their characters. As The Stranger puts it, ‘Life, which before was only a vast absurdity, 
has now taken on a meaning, and I make out an intention where before there was only 
chance.’ (1983 153) Moreover, ‘Eve’ is a name that at the moment of nomination means 
nothing to either The Stranger or The Lady, standing outside the Christian redemption story 
as they do at that point. Only later does the name retrospectively begin to be filled with 
meaning, in light of the consequences of the initial event and a realisation of their part in the 
redemption narrative. The Lady thus reveals in hindsight, ‘It seems to me that I have tasted 
from the Tree of Knowledge, my eyes have been opened and now I can distinguish good 
from evil… I see now why I had to call myself Eve.’ (197) Out of the ‘darkness’ of ‘this long 
road to Damascus’ (337), new subjects are born—subjects faithful to an initial act of 
nomination by a nameless voice. In The Stranger’s words, 
 
Where am I? Where have I been? Is it winter, summer or spring? What century am I 
in? And what region of the world? Am I young or old? Man or woman? Am I a god 
or a devil?... Silence, I’ve just made a leap in time of thousands of years, and I am 
beginning to distil myself, to reassemble myself, to crystallise myself! A little 
patience and, soon, for the second time I will have been created and, bursting out 
from the dark waters of creation, the lotus flower will extend its head towards the sun 
to say: it is I! (277-8) 
 
 
Part Three: The Future of Names 
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2.1 The Road to Damascus 1: The Theory of Discourses 
In the previous part, I juxtaposed Badiou’s naming of the true with dramatic true names in 
order to provide some idea of the rough similarities that might pertain between the two. Thus, 
Strindberg, like Badiou, structures his drama around names that are simultaneously empty 
and excessive, that are given forth anonymously, that recognise that something new has 
occurred, and that generate subjects faithful to that novelty. In this second part of the essay, I 
want to try to define more exactly the difference separating the two—that is, to return to the 
terms of the Introduction, to specify why Badiou’s Paula remains a mystic-without-mysticism 
irreducible to the ecstatic illumination experienced by Strindberg’s characters. 
 As I mentioned in the Introduction, the simplest means of distinguishing the two in 
Badiouian terms is with respect to the category of the obscure subject from Logics of Worlds. 
A mystic subject is an obscure subject, for it ‘systematically resorts to the invocation of a full 
and pure transcendent Body, an ahistorical or anti-evental body (City, God, Race. . .) from 
which it follows that the trace [of the event] will be denied.’ (2009 59) This recourse to an 
atemporal, pure presence allows for an ascent away from the new in the name of silent 
devotion to the obscure. The mystic forces ‘the descent of [the evental] present into the night 
of non-exposition’ (59), or, as Badiou puts it more fully,  
 
The obscure subject offers the chance of a new destiny, under the incomprehensible 
but salvific sign of an absolute body, whose only demand is that one serves it by 
nurturing everywhere and at all times the hatred of every living thought, every 
transparent language and every uncertain becoming. (61) 
 
The obscure subject works in signs and ciphers, desires an atemporal release from the present 
and finds destiny in transcendence. The obscure subject erases truths by means of divine 
names, rather than naming the truths themselves.  
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 Such obscurantism is evidently present throughout Strindberg’s The Road to 
Damascus: the present is benighted, under the sway of maleficent powers
15
 who 
communicate their existence through half-hidden signs
16
. Temporal life takes place under the 
curse of Deuteronomy 28: ‘Cursed shalt thou be in the city, and cursed shalt thou be in the 
field… [etc]’. An exchange between The Stranger and his mother-in-law illustrates this 
gradual emergence of an obscure subject through the play particularly clear: 
 
The Mother:  You still doubt? 
The Stranger:  Yes, many things. But a truth begins to dawn on the horizon. 
The Mother:  What truth? 
The Stranger:  That there exists… things and… forces in which I did not believe 
until now. 
The Mother:  Have you noticed also that it is neither you nor any other human 
being who guides your extraordinary destiny? 
The Stranger: That is what I thought I noticed. 
The Mother: Then you have travelled a part of the path. (1983 204) 
 
There is a quasi-Badiouian moment here when ‘a truth begins to dawn’, but it is immediately 
covered over: any sense of novelty or eventhood is perverted into the language of timeless 
deities and supernatural destinies. The emergent truth is definitively occulted. 
 The road to Damascus is therefore not merely an ascent towards a redemptive name 
(as outlined in Part Two), but also a descent into ever-increasing torments of malediction and 
exile.
17
 These parallel paths of damnation and salvation undertaken simultaneously—‘the 
                                                          
15
 See Strindberg 1983 235 
16
 For example, The Stranger exclaims, ‘I do not know whether it is someone else or myself whose presence I 
sense, but in solitude we are never alone. The air thickens, the air swells and entities are born. We do not see 
them. But we sense their presence.’ (1983 152) 
17
 It is for this reason that Strindberg continually confuses the road to Damascus with the road to Calvary 
throughout the plays (1983 209, 216, 218). 
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Eternal’s anger is always a kind of grace’ (227)—take us back to Strindberg’s poetic project 
in which a fictional double is afflicted in order for the creator to be beatified. This double-
moment in fact informs Strindberg’s own interpretation of Paul: ‘As Saint Paul says: his body 
is delivered to the tortures of Satan, so that his soul can be amended and merit its salvation’ 
(229)—and it is here that Strindberg stands furthest from Badiou.18 
 And yet, as I argued in the Introduction, even this definitive distinction between the 
militant subject (e.g. Paula) and the obscure subject (e.g. The Stranger) is not enough. My 
task in this paper is to distinguish Badiou and Strindberg’s practices of naming, and while the 
category of the obscure subject differentiates the subject that names, the ground of naming 
and its purpose, the names themselves remain indiscernible. To repeat, there seems no 
distinction between Paula’s language in The Incident at Antioch and The Stranger’s in The 
Road to Damascus. From a linguistic, rhetorical and pragmatic point of view, the speeches of 
a mystic-without-mysticism repeat those of the fully-blown mystic. My aim in the second 
half of this paper is therefore to discriminate more finely the differences that pertain to 
practices of naming in themselves. Where does the radical difference Badiou relies upon 
reside and how precisely does it manifest itself in the name? To achieve this, I turn to the 
theory of discourses put forward in Saint Paul. It is here we find Badiou’s most sustained 
engagement with mystic discourse. 
 
* 
 
Chapter Four of Saint Paul proposes ‘a schema of discourses’ that articulate four ‘subjective 
dispositions’: the prophet, the wise man, the apostle and the mystic. Prophetic discourse, 
represented in Paul’s writings by the figure of the Jew, is one of signs: ‘a prophet is one who 
                                                          
18
 See Badiou’s rejection of any reading of Paul as legitimating masochism or suffering in general, 2003 66-8. 
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abides in the requisition of signs… testifying to transcendence by exposing the obscure to its 
deciphering.’ On the other hand, the discourse of wisdom, represented by the Greek, is one of 
immanence and cosmic totality. It is transmitted in the form of the philosophical syllogism. 
(2003 41) Paul’s own discourse of the apostle is positioned ‘equidistant from Jewish 
prophesy and Greek logos’ (43), ‘subtracted from both’ (50). Apostolic discourse is ‘a speech 
of rupture’ (31) that bears witness to the event: ‘What matters is to declare in one’s own 
name that what took place took place’ (44) Badiou continues, 
 
What imposes the invention of a new discourse, and a subjectivity that is neither 
philosophical nor prophetic (the apostle), is precisely that it is only by means of such 
invention that the event finds a welcome and an existence in language. For 
established languages, it is inadmissible because it is genuinely unnameable. (46) 
 
Apostolic discourse is linguistically and rhetorically inventive, insofar as it names the 
unnameable by means of illegal names drawn from the void. It is the ‘language of the naked 
event, which alone captures thought’ (53). The apostle speaks anew, with fresh names both 
empty and full of meaning. 
 There is one other discourse, and Badiou elucidates it by means of a gloss on 
Corinthians II.12: 
 
Let us note in passing that Paul delineates, as if in shadowy outline, a fourth possible 
discourse, besides the Greek (wisdom), the Jew (signs), and the Christian (eventual 
declaration). This discourse… would be that of the miracle, and Paul gives it a name, 
subjective discourse of glorification. It is the discourse of the ineffable, the discourse 
of nondiscourse. It is the subject as silent and mystical intimacy, inhabited by ‘things 
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that cannot be told’… only experienced by the subject who has been visited by a 
miracle. (2003 51) 
 
This mystic will speak in ‘unutterable utterances’ alone (51): apophatic words that 
immediately negate themselves into silence, words that point to intimate illuminations 
impossible to communicate, words that inadequately testify to inner miracles. Such words are 
utterly ‘obscurantist’ (52). Moreover, Badiou goes on to argue that such a discourse—as soon 
as it is uttered—immediately become indiscernible from a prophetic discourse of signs: 
 
Supposing I invoke the fourth discourse, and hence the private, unutterable 
utterances, in order to justify the third (that of Christian faith), I relapse inevitable 
into the second discourse, that of the sign, the Jewish discourse. For what is a 
prophecy if not a sign of what is to come? And what is a miracle if not a sign of the 
transcendence of the True? (53) 
 
Both the mystic and the prophet must make recourse to obscure signs that point beyond: the 
first to a transcendent realm without, the second to immaculate experience within. However, 
whether inner or outer, such transcendence can only be hinted at in cryptic images and 
apophatic practices. We are back here with the obscure subject of Logics of Worlds who 
occults the present through gnomic reference to an atemporal plenitude outside of time. 
 And yet… obscurantism is not to be dismissed so readily, for it haunts the very 
discourse from which it is supposed to be discarded. The mystic ‘is like an Other within’ 
(2003 51)—‘within’, that is, the very heart of Badiou and Paul’s own militant language of the 
event. In other words, according to Badiou, Paul’s apostolic discourse is constituted by means 
of distancing itself from the fourth discourse of the mystic as much as from those of the 
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prophet and wise man, but nevertheless subtraction from the mystical is a far more difficult 
and less clear-cut procedure than in the other instances.  
 This becomes particularly evident in Badiou’s interpretation of Corinthians II.1: 
 
Clearly then, for Paul, miracles exist and have concerned him. He delineates a 
particular subjective figure, that of the ‘exalted’ man, who has perhaps been 
summoned out of his body during the course of his life. But this figure is precisely 
not the one the apostle is going to present. The apostle must be accountable only for 
what others see and hear, which is to say, his declaration. He has no need to glorify 
himself in the name of that other subject who has spoken with God (2003 51) 
 
The mystic disposition is not rejected entirely; it is not even altogether avoided. It is, rather, 
acknowledged, then immediately silenced. Paul draws attention to its presence at the very 
moment he eschews it. It takes the place of ‘the Other within himself’. In Badiou’s terms, 
mystic discourse lies ‘unaddressed’ within the apostolic, and this seems to involve a 
complicated operation of almost simultaneous admission and denial of the mystical. Hence, 
Paul ‘refuses to let addressed discourses… be justif[ied] through an unaddressed discourse, 
whose substance consists in unutterable utterances’, but nevertheless this unaddressed 
mysticism still holds ‘a marginal and inactive position’ and ‘remains a mute supplement’. 
(52) This is a very significant admission: the language of mysticism supplements—even if 
mutely—the language of the event. It does not stand outside a discourse of truths like 
something merely jettisoned, but remains a necessary, if continuously silenced, component 
within it. 
 Badiou’s later relation to his own ‘mysterious’ theory of the supernumerary name 
bears similarities to this, as we have seen. This component of Being and Event stands both 
inside and outside the system, a vital part of its development (for it stands centre-stage in the 
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original exposition of the event) and yet belatedly reduced to a marginal, silent and inactive 
remainder. The name is perpetually abjected as ‘the Other within’. Just as for Paul, therefore, 
Badiou’s rejection of the mysterious depends on the stability of this complicated procedure of 
silencing from within, a constant self-purification in which mystical remnants are forever 
being swept into the corner. And it is the question of such stability that I now wish to tackle 
in the final section of this paper by having one final go at delineating the difference between 
Badiou’s names and those of the mystic from a slightly different, if related, perspective: the 
temporality of the name. 
 
2.2 The Road to Damascus 2: Hermeneutics, Apocalyptics and Pragmatics 
Badiou is always in the midst of purifying his thought of mysticism. At the opening of Saint 
Paul, he makes this point, more generally, as follows, 
 
The crucible in which what will become a work of art and thought burns is brimful 
with nameless impurities; it comprises obsessions, beliefs, infantile puzzles, various 
perversions, undivulgeable memories, haphazard reading, and quite a few idiocies 
and chimeras. Analyzing this alchemy is of little use. (2003 2) 
 
While this image is intended to apply to Paul’s oeuvre, I am arguing that it needs also to be 
referred back to Badiou’s own philosophy: the supernumerary name is treated as an impurity 
forever being burnt off in the attempt to distil pure Badiouianism. The irony, of course, 
consists in the fact that, since the above repeats alchemical imagery quite explicitly, it 
immediately raises the spectre of the mysterious once more, drawing Badiou’s language back 
into proximity to those fully-blown mystics, like Strindberg, who never tire of alchemical 
metaphor and who likewise insist on a continual process of self-purification. They too 
exclaim, ‘I will be purified like gold is purified by fire’ (1983 232)! 
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 And so the question of what distinguishes such indiscernible images recurs. As a final 
attempt to elucidate it, I want to consider Badiou’s difference from the mystic in terms of 
three tenses of the name—that is, in terms of the temporalities which structure processes of 
meaning-acquisition. The question, then, is in what timeframe do names gain meaning. 
Badiou and Strindberg alike insist on the emptiness of the name in the present; they both, that 
is, agree that the name is at present senseless with respect to existing languages—so then the 
ways in which it comes to gain meaning are crucial. And it is my contention in what follows 
that the time in which this happens ultimately, if precariously, distinguishes Badiou’s names 
from those of the mystic. Initially, however, a rough classificatory schema is required. There 
are three tenses of the name on which I wish to focus: the first (hermeneutics) is past-
oriented; the latter two (apocalyptics, pragmatics) both oriented towards the future. 
 
* 
 
The hermeneutic tradition interprets a name in terms of its effective history: meaning takes 
the form of baggage that each word carries forward. It is why memory, community and the 
transmission of texts become such significant categories. Ricoeur’s comments on the name of 
God illustrate this clearly: ‘Naming God only comes about through the milieu of a 
presupposition… This is the presupposition: Naming God is what has already taken place in 
the texts’ (2000 163; my emphasis) In other words, names are rooted in ‘a historical drama’, 
‘bound up with the founding events in which the community of interpretation recognises 
itself enrooted, set up and established. It is these events that name God.’ (170) The task of the 
hermeneut is therefore to recognise that meaning has always already occurred and so to allow 
the past to manifest itself in all of its complexity. This gives rise to ‘a poetics of politics’ 
(181) grounded in responsibility to the already-existing truths of tradition, as well as an 
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obligation to come to terms with one’s own identity in light of its ineradicable roots. In short, 
meaning arrives from the past, and a name has always already received its sense. 
 Badiou’s hostility to hermeneutics is well-documented19, and is as virulent here as 
elsewhere. For example, Ricoeur’s stress on ‘the duty to remember’ leads, according to 
Badiou, to ‘the victory of the Christian vision’ (2006 27.1). The hermeneut is necessarily a 
‘Christian subject’ (27.2), for meaning is only acquired here in relation to ‘founding events’ 
and transmission through communities of interpretation (churches). The fundamental 
conservatism of this conception of names evidently impedes the arrival of the new. As 
Badiou writes of Paul, ‘The apostle is neither a material witness, nor a memory.’ (2003 44) 
 
* 
 
An equally popular strain of recent philosophical reflection on the name identifies the advent 
of meaning with the messianic or apocalyptic. In Derrida’s definition of the messianic, it is ‘a 
logic turned toward the future… in a heterogeneous and disjointed time’ (1994 181). The 
name receives meaning suddenly from the void.
20
 This conception of the name informs 
Derrida and Levinas’ writings on language, but it is in the early work of Philip Goodchild 
that I wish to locate it briefly here. 
 On Goodchild’s basically Bergsonian philosophy of language21, words fail to get at 
life, so the acquisition of meaning requires the destruction of the word. Only by 
‘relinquishing its grasp on the sign’ does thought ‘return to actual lived experience’ (2002 
238). That is, vital forces ‘remain secret’ (228), unable to be symbolically represented, for 
‘the sign does not contain a trace of the life of the thing’ (117). At present, language kills. In 
fact, signs only signify at all successfully with respect to the future, by indicating a meaning-
                                                          
19
 See, for example, Badiou 2004 22-40. 
20
 See Derrida 2002 213-4. 
21
 See Goodchild 2000 106, 150-1. 
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to-come that cannot yet be delivered: ‘The sign constitutes a promise for faith of the coming 
of the truth… Finally the apocalyptic moment may arrive.’ (228-9) At the moment, words 
fail, but this does not preclude the possibility of a radical break in the future that will 
ultimately ‘plunge [thought] into the categories of life’ (223). This is why Goodchild insists 
upon ‘construct[ing] ontology on the basis of the future’ (x), even if such construction-work 
requires patience in expectation of the rupture-to-come. If writing a philosophy-book is 
doomed to failure now, all one can do is wait: ‘Absolute faith allows the future to be 
constituted as a gift… Absolute faith waits.’ (237) 
 Badiou’s response to such apocalypticism is simple: ‘If everything depends on an 
event, must we wait? Certainly not… Thought does not wait, and it has never exhausted its 
reserve of power.’ (2003 111) He substitutes optimism in the power of the faithful subject for 
such pessimism. For Badiou, the subject can always act now in the wake of the event; the 
future Goodchild so fervently prays for has already taken place. 
 
* 
 
Hence, Badiou replaces the apocalyptic future with a pragmatic one, involving the ad hoc 
working out of meaning in signifying practices. His is a pragmatics of the name. The evental 
name is meaningless for the moment, but the task of the faithful subject is to keep on uttering 
it, slowly devising a new ‘subject-language’ that spirals outwards from the supernumerary 
name and that remains illegal from the point of view of pre-existing languages. The 
accumulation of meaning depends on the labour of the subject: the militant does not wait; she 
talks.
22
 In Being and Event, Badiou describes this process of meaning-acquisition as follows, 
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 See Badiou 2003 88. 
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[Initially, outsiders] generally consider that these names are empty…. an arbitrary and 
content-free language… These witnesses, in a certain sense, are right. The names 
generated—or rather, composed—by a subject are suspended, with respect to their 
signification, from the ‘to-come’ of truth… [They] displace the established 
significations and leave the referent void: this void will have been filled if truth 
comes to pass as a new situation. (2005 398-9) 
 
More precisely, however, from the militant subject’s perspective, ‘The subject generates 
names whose referent is in the future anterior… Such names “will have been” assigned a 
referent or a signification.’ (398; my emphasis) 
The subject works at language, ‘bend[s] and change[s]’ pre-existing meanings so as to 
articulate the novelty of the event. Here resides the ‘power’ of the speaking subject—in the 
capacity to alter, emend and generate meanings for the sake of the new. (2001 82) Texts that 
bear witness to the event therefore have a pragmatic function: they form part of the ongoing 
labour of a subject-language in constituting a new form of words out of the ruins of the old. 
Thus, Badiou writes that truth demands ‘those enquiries, sermons, works and statements in 
which these names are realised.’ (395) There is no responsibility towards a founding past, nor 
is his concern the self-conscious failings of an apocalyptic text written in the hope that it will 
one day mean something. Badiou’s future is homogeneous and meaning-acquisition is 
gradual. To quote from Saint Paul once more, ‘Truth is a process, not an illumination.’ (2003 
15) 
 
* 
 
Badiou, then, insists upon a futural pragmatics of the name, flatly rejecting both hermeneutics 
and apocalyptics as models for meaning-acquisition. In Strindberg’s mystic theatre, however, 
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one finds a much more inclusive and, for this reason, eclectic range of practices: Strindberg 
embraces many different modes of meaning-acquisition in The Road to Damascus, and in 
consequence his names possess more than one tense. This rich temporal texture is to be 
definitively contrasted with Badiou’s purified future anterior. 
 As we have already seen at length, the assortment of names circulating in The Road to 
Damascus are all old ones—names mainly drawn from the Old and New Testaments. This is 
true not only of the names received on the stages of life’s way (Cain, Eve, the Prodigal Son 
etc), but also the final true name bestowed on The Stranger, John, which explicitly makes 
reference to John the Baptist (both ‘preached in the desert’ [1983 359]). As we have seen, 
Badiou never denies that old names can be deployed in new ways; however, what 
distinguishes Strindberg’s names at this juncture, and approximates to a Ricoeurian model, is 
the fact that the characters only make sense of their new names in reference to old stories. 
They begin to see themselves as repetitions, re-enacting the Biblical stories again and again.
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As the trilogy unfolds, the sense that there is nothing new under the sun grows stronger: each 
character is doomed to repeat the same part ad infinitum. These are names that gain meaning 
from the past. 
 At the same time, however, apocalyptic symbolism is also present. The river and 
White House in The Road to Damascus III, in particular, point to a heterogeneous future-to-
come, where a radically new form of beatific life is possible. In the White House, time stops 
and meaning attains fullness; it is only here—at the end of time—that The Stranger is able to 
receive a a true baptism. The action prior to this moment had consisted in glimpses of 
redemption, obscure signs gesturing towards the White House. This is equally true of the 
transitory names that the characters receive: they await meaning in the White House; they 
only gain their significance in relation to the final name, John. 
                                                          
23
 Nowhere is this shown better than in the court case of The Road to Damascus III where the Tempter 
demonstrates at length that all human subjects merely repeat Eve’s primal sin (1983 321-5). 
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 Moreover, in addition to a hermeneutics and an apocalyptics of names, traces of a 
mystic pragmatics can also be found throughout The Road to Damascus. Indeed, how else 
does a Strindbergian drama function if not through the gradual accumulation of senses for 
names through their continual textual circulation and dramatic performance. Names are 
coupled with, then divorced from others; they are forgotten, then remembered; they are 
predicated of literal and metaphorical properties; they are spoken in different voice, different 
tones and from different postures. And this process is nothing else but the way in which 
names gain meaning in the theatre. When The Stranger baptises Eve at the beginning of the 
trilogy, the sense of the name exists in the future anterior (as it does with traditional 
baptisms); it will have meaning only once it has been deployed, circulated and worked upon. 
The plays themselves perform a pragmatic labour on names.
24
 
 In opposition to Badiou’s insistence on temporal purity, Strindberg mixes tenses: the 
past, the apocalyptic future and the pragmatic future co-exist, all cumulatively contributing to 
the accumulation of meaning in his plays. He practises a confusion of the tenses. It is here, 
moreover, that I consider the distinction between the Badiouian name and the mystic name to 
be greatest. The mystic’s empty name is filled from tradition, from the coming apocalypse as 
well as from the pragmatic working out of a text. Badiou, on the other hand, insists on a 
constant vigilance in maintaining the purity of the pragmatic mode. Names for the true are 
kept pristine by means of the perpetual warding off of ‘nameless impurities’ (such as 
hermeneutic and apocalyptic meaning-acquisition). Discursive purity is to be maintained at 
all costs. One might ask in closing, however: if ‘philosophy is always (re)naming’ (Badiou 
2009 521), is such a drive to purity at all feasible? Perhaps instead, just as the mystic mode of 
discourse collapses into the prophetic, pragmatic naming cannot uphold the integrity of its 
                                                          
24
 Again, we must return to the The Stranger’s rationale for this act of nomination: ‘By giving her a name 
myself, I made her mine, and I intend to transform her completely according to my will.’ (1983 188) This is the 
perspective of the playwright: characters receive names as part of a process of formation, of manipulation. The 
Stranger, in effect, claims: Eve will have become my double, for she will have become ‘Eve’—and the same is 
true of Strindberg’s mystic pragmatics as a whole. 
33 
 
borders either. Or perhaps, just as the supernumerary name is constantly expelled as ‘the 
Other within’, so too other modes of meaning-acquisition exist mutely within the system as 
internal tears—marginal, inactive supplements to the official system. 
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